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To improve its declining combat readiness the Army is
requesting a significant budget increase. The Army plans to
use the increase for primarily improving quality of life
issues. This thesis argues that this plan is inadequate and
will result in only marginal readiness gains. The purpose of
this thesis is to explore the underlying causes of the
readiness crisis and to offer an alternative framework for
reversing the decline.
This thesis begins by defining readiness from the
perspectives of operational and structural readiness. It
then explores the critical readiness questions of: What
should be ready? What should it be ready for? and When
should it be ready? The thesis also examines the impact of
the drawdown and commitments to peace operations (POs) on
Army readiness. To illustrate the influence of these
variables on readiness, this thesis develops a readiness
threshold model that measures the capacity of a given force
to participate in POs before its readiness deteriorates.
By using the model to analyze the current size of the
force in relation to its PO commitments, this thesis finds
that the cost of doing too much with too little is a
reduction in the Army's combat readiness. The thesis
concludes by examining both policy implications and
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The end of the Cold War presented many challenges for
the Army. Not the least of these challenges was maintaining
its combat readiness despite massive reductions in manpower
and the increasing requirement to provide forces for peace
operations (POs). 1 Recent congressional testimony by the
Army Chief of Staff verified for the first time the widely
held belief of the past few years that the Army had indeed
lost the battle to maintain its combat readiness. To
improve its readiness the Army is requesting a significant
budget increase. The Army plans to use the additional funds
for primarily improving quality of life concerns to include
increasing military pay and retirement benefits.
The purpose of this thesis is to present an alternative
perspective on (1) the factors that underlie the Army's
readiness crisis and (2) the solutions required for real
readiness improvements. These perspectives will go beyond
much of the current analysis that suggests the readiness
decline is simply the result of a declining defense budget.
This alternate view also challenges the idea that the
decline can be remedied with budget increases that focus
1 POs are generally viewed as one of the Army's most
demanding non-combat missions due to their usually prolonged
nature and requirement for large number of combat forces.
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largely on quality of life improvements. This thesis argues
that to address the fundamental source of the readiness
problem, the absolute size of the Army's combat forces must
either increase or their commitment to peace operations must
decrease
.
This thesis begins by defining readiness from the
perspectives of operational and structural readiness.
Operational readiness addresses the efficiency or quality of
a force of a given size. Conversely, structural readiness
addresses the mass or quantity of an available force. It
also explores the critical questions of; What should be
ready? What should it be ready for? When should it be
ready? In response, this thesis proposes that: 1) The Army's
battalion level infantry and armor forces must be ready/
They must be fully trained and manned.
2) They should be ready to fight and win two Major Theater
Wars (MTWs). 3 3) They need to be ready for both an
2 I acknowledge that complete combat readiness is of course
a function of other factors beyond the training and number
of combat force on-hand. The availability of Combat Service
Support units, equipment, morale and other variables
definitely impact overall readiness. This thesis, however,
focuses on the battalion level combat forces as the
principal component of the Army's combat readiness.
3 The 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR) recommended re-structuring
the military to enable it to adequately respond to two Major
Regional Contingencies (the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
replaced this term with Major Theater War) occurring at the
same time.
xiv
immediate or extended deployment to an MTW . In summary, for
the purposes of this thesis, it is argued that the quality
and quantity of infantry and armor units the Army provides
for its MTW commitments is the principle measure of its
degree of combat readiness.
Phase 1 of this study examines the role of two key
variables, the drawdown and commitment to POs, on the Army's
combat readiness. Phase 2 illustrates the impact of these
variables on readiness through the development of a
readiness threshold model that measures the capacity of a
given force to participate in POs before its readiness
deteriorates. Phase 3 applies the model to analyze current
readiness in regard to the ongoing PO in Bosnia. This phase
also analyzes the future readiness effects if the Army's
current PO commitments increase. Phase 4 presents key
findings and implications.
The central findings of this thesis are twofold. First,
the Army's readiness- crisis is in great part a function of
the compounding, self-reinforcing impact of the drawdown and
over-commitment to POs. Second, the quality of life
"readiness fix" advocated by the Army will likely fall far
short of coming to terms with reversing the long-term
readiness decline of its combat forces.
The implications that flow from these findings suggest
xv
that the Army may not have the ability to provide an
adequate quantity of troops possessing the necessary quality
that could fight and win two MTWs without significant risk.
Taken a step further, application of the model also implies
that the U.S. may need to re-address the viability of the
two MTW concept in general. Other implications suggest both
restructuring the current force size and reevaluating
commitments to current and future POs.
The alternative perspective on readiness that this
study advocates, that is, viewing the readiness decline from
both the operational and structural perspectives of the
drawdown and over-commitment to POs extends beyond just the
Army's readiness crisis. The basic premise of the readiness
threshold model could be used to analyze the readiness
declines plaguing the rest of the Armed Forces
The fundamentals that underlie the readiness crises of
the Army's sister services are the same as its own.
Increasingly, the U.S. Military, not just the Army, is asked
to do too much with too little.
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I . INTRODUCTION
This readiness crisis didn't come out of nowhere.
Sen. Bob Smith 4
If we don't do something we run the risk of returning
to the 'hollow force' of the 1970s...
Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Reimer 5
A . BACKGROUND
The end of the Cold War presented many complex
challenges for the U.S. Army. Some of the more obvious
challenges included the rise of asymmetric threats, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the
harnessing of information technology. These important issues
aside, there was perhaps a more fundamental challenge the
Army faced (and still faces) that threatened its mission of
fighting and winning the nations wars: maintaining its
combat readiness.
Unfortunately it appears the dilemma of maintaining an
acceptable level of readiness despite massive reductions in
manpower and the increasing requirement to provide forces
4 Thomas E. Ricks, "Joint Chiefs Tell Senate Military Faces
Readiness Crisis, Needs Bigger Budget," Wall Street Journal,
30 September, 1998, 6.
5 Ibid.
for peace operations (POs) 6 has proven to be too great of a
challenge for the Army. One of the first indicators of a
decrease in the Army's readiness was a 1994 Army report that
stated that three of its combat divisions had fallen below
acceptable levels of combat preparedness. 7 Since the report
was issued, mounting anecdotal evidence suggests that the
Army is entrenched in a severe readiness crisis. Recently,
the commander of U.S. based Army Forces wrote a memo to the
Army chief of staff which confirmed the spirit of these
reports
:
My assessment is not good news... We can no longer
train and sustain the force, stop infrastructure
degradation, and provide our soldiers
the .. .programs critical to long-term
success ... This threatens our ability to mobilize,
deploy, fight and win. 8
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to identify
the underlying causes of the Army' s current readiness crisis
and offer prescriptions for improving the Army' s long term
combat readiness.
6 POs are generally viewed as one of the Army's most
demanding non-combat missions due to their usually prolonged
nature and requirement for large number of combat forces.
7 Clarke, Philip C, U.S. Military has a Readiness Gap
(Milford, Pa.: America's Future Inc., 1998, accessed 13
April 1998); available from
http: //www. execpc . com/- j fish/fwiw/fwiw0130.txt; Internet
.
8 Jonathan Landay, "Signs of Erosion In the U.S. Military,"
Christian Science Monitor, 16 September 1998, 1.
1 . Points of Confusion Concerning Readiness
As reports of the Army' s readiness decline surfaced, a
debate emerged over its extent and nature. A recent article
from the Washington Post explains:
While senior members of President Clinton'
s
national security team contend they have managed
the post-Cold War drawdown more adeptly than other
demobilization's this century, the republicans
argue that U.S. forces have been cut too much and
committed to too many overseas operations. 9
Like most politically contentious issues, the debate over
the extent of the purported readiness decline generated
sharp disagreements over definitions.
Underlying these disagreements are at least three major
points of confusion regarding readiness definitions
including: 1) What should be ready? 2) What should a given
force be ready for? 3) When should the force be ready?
Discussion of the readiness issue without the framework
these questions provide obscures a clear picture of the
Army's true state of readiness. 10
The Department of Defense (DOD) manages to avoid all
three questions in an official readiness definition that
states readiness is,
9 Bradley Graham, "Senators Scold Military Chiefs,"
Washington Post, 30 September, 1998, 2.
10 Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness : Concepts , Choices,
Consequences (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
1995), 33.
...the overall ability of forces to arrive where
they're needed, on time, and prepared to
effectively carry out assigned mission objectives
for which they were designed. 11
Others offer differing opinions of what constitutes
readiness. Dr. Richard Betts, of Columbia University,
introduces the concepts of operational and structural
readiness to the definitional debate. In his explanation
operational readiness is "the ability of forces to fight
immediately without training or extra mobilization". 12 This
type of readiness addresses the efficiency or guality of a
force of some given size. Indicators of operational
readiness include both fill of assigned manpower and
training status of individuals and units.
Conversely, structural readiness concerns the number
of organized units that increase military power, but require
time during a crisis to prepare for combat. 13 This type of
readiness addresses the mass or quantity of a force. Key
indicators of structural readiness include the number of
troops under arms and available units.
Dr. Betts, in his book, Military Readiness , Concepts
,
Choices , and Consequences explains that these two
11 DOD Annual Defense Report, Chapter IV Readiness
(Washington D.C., 1995, accessed 15 May 1998); available
from http : www. dtic.mil:80/execsec/adr95/read_. html
12 Betts, 33.
13 Ibid.
perspectives, operational and structural readiness, often
compete for primacy and resources . He argues that in an era
of declining defense budgets, the choice between quantity
and quality,
...is analogous to that between fielding a full
football team of eleven players who are flabby, do
not all have helmets, and have not studied
playbooks or practiced together, and fielding a
team of eight who are in perfect physical
condition, fully equipped, and have drilled to
perfection. The former team is preferable if it
has a month or so to get in shape, the latter if
the game is to occur tomorrow. 14
a. Defining Readiness : What Should be Ready?
In football, the unit of readiness measurement is
the preparedness of the team. Other variables such as the
draft, a team's scouting program, facilities, and salaries,
while important, are subordinate to the fundamental
readiness consideration: team readiness. The same can be
said of Army readiness. The Army's basic unit of readiness,
like that of a football team's, is its combat forces. 15 Too
often though, maintaining the readiness of this essential
element is subordinated to other supporting issues such as
recruitment, retention, modernization, facilities,
maintenance, and quality of life issues. Again, like
14 Ibid.
15 For the purpose of this thesis, combat forces refer to
the number of infantry and armor battalions currently
available in the Army.
scouting and salaries in football, these issues while
critical to the overall long-term success of combat forces,
are not of principal importance.
b. Defining Readiness : Ready for What?
The Army, along with the rest of the armed
services, claims its forces must be ready to fight and win
two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs). The 1993
Bottom Up Review (BUR) recommended re-structuring the
military to ensure it could adequately respond to two Major
Regional Contingencies (the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
replaced this term with Major Theater War) occurring at the
same time. Ostensibly, these conflicts would occur in the
Middle East and Northeast Asia. 16 Many defense experts,
however, denounce the two MTW scenario as unrealistic based
on the current threat and the supposed global primacy of the
U.S. Armed Forces. Nonetheless, the ability to fight and
win two MTWs remains the foundation of the current National
Military strategy.
c . Defining Readiness : Ready for When ?
The Army' s degree of readiness should depend in
part on when it would have to fight an MTW. The football
analogy stated previously, concludes that while an
16 Sortor, Ronald E., Army Forces for Operations Other Than
War, Santa Monica, California: RAND, MR-852-A, 1997, 2.
undermanned, fully trained team is more prepared for a game
played tomorrow, a fully manned under-trained team would be
better suited for a game played in a month. Similarly, if
the Army is needed immediately to fight an MTW, as would be
the likely case in a Korean MTW scenario, the operational
"hair trigger" readiness of the force is most important. If,
instead, the Army has six months to prepare to fight, as was
the case in the Gulf War, a more "relaxed" structural
readiness of the force is critical.
Given the difficulty in divining threats in the
post-Cold War era (which drove the creation of the "two MTW
strategy" in the first place) it is reasonable to assume
that the Army should be ready for both an immediate MTW
deployment and an "extended preparation" MTW deployment.
2 . Definition Framework
With regard to the three questions posed earlier: 1)
What should be ready? 2) What should it be ready for? 3) How
soon does it need to be ready?, this thesis proposes the
following: 1) The Army's battalion level infantry and armor
forces need to be ready. 17 This means they must be fully
17 I acknowledge that complete combat readiness is of course
a function of other factors beyond the training and number
of combat force on-hand. The availability of Combat Service
Support units, equipment, morale and other variables
definitely impact overall readiness. This thesis, however,
focuses on the battalion level combat forces as the
principal component of the Army's combat readiness.
trained and manned. 2) They must be ready to fight and win
two MTWs. (3) They must be ready for both an immediate or
extended deployment to an MTW. In summary, for the purposes
of this thesis, it will be argued that the quality and
quantity of infantry and armor units the Army provides for
its MTW commitments are the principle measures of its degree
of combat readiness.
3. The Foundations of the Readiness Crisis
The Army and the other services recently changed their
position on the readiness of their forces. They now claim
that there are serious readiness shortfalls within their
respective services. In the words of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, readiness is "nosing
down". 18 The services now point to indicators like
declining retention and recruitment statistics, lack of
spare parts, canceled training, deteriorating retirement and
health benefits, inadequate pay and housing, and lowered
morale as proof positive of a readiness decline. 19 During
recent Congressional Testimony, Army Chief of Staff, General
Reimer, stated "If we don't do something we run the risk of
a return to the 'hollow force' of the 1970s, when spare
18 Steven Lee Myers, "Military Leaders Make Case To Clinton
For More Money," New York Times, 16 September, 1998, Sec. A,
22.
19 Richter, Paul, "Military to Argue For More Funding," Los
Angeles Times, 30 September 1998, 10.
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parts were unavailable and morale plummeted." 20 To prevent
the re-appearance of the "hollow force", the Joint Chiefs
are requesting an increase in the defense budget. General
Shelton is expected to request a $25 billion annual increase
in the Pentagon's 1999 budget. The Chairman,
...appears inclined to spend much of the increase on
boosting military pay and military retirement
benefits, despite a lack of clear evidence that




In essence, with their request for a budget increase,
the "Chiefs are pushing for... a comprehensive plan to signal
to military people that they are needed, wanted, and
valued." 22
This thesis argues that, in the short term, the Army
cannot buy its way out of the readiness decline. While
pressing quality of life issues rightfully demand
improvements, enhancements in these areas are likely only to
marginally boost readiness. Additionally, increases in
training budgets and equipment modernization will surely
increase readiness, but again only at the periphery. These
stop-gap improvements cannot "fix" the readiness problem. To
remedy the readiness crisis in the long term, the Army must
20 Ricks, "Joint Chiefs Tell Senate," 6.
21 Ibid.
22 Pexton, Patrick B., "Dwindling Ranks," Washington Post,
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look beyond the ancillary, reinforcing factors outlined
above, and address the more significant underlying causes of
the decline.
4 . The Nature of The Drawdown and Peace Operations
This thesis argues that two major factors underlie the
Army's readiness crisis. The first is the massive post-Cold
War reduction of Army combat forces. The second is the sharp
increase in Army PO participation during this same period.
The combination of a small force, over-committed to POs, has
had a compounding negative effect on the Army's readiness.
This thesis will show how POs negatively affect the quality
or operational readiness of combat forces, as the drawdown
simultaneously reduces the structural readiness or quantity
of the available force. While other factors such as morale,
quality of life concerns, spare parts shortages and canceled
training most certainly contribute to the decline, they
simply serve to reinforce and extend its pervasiveness. The
bedrock cause of the decline is simple: the Army is being
called upon to do too much with too little.
a. The Drawdown
Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has
drastically reduced its operating budgets, manpower, and
infrastructure. Overall, the Army reduced its total strength
10
by thirty-six percent. Table 1.1 depicts the decline in Army
manpower at the division level.
Table 1.1. Declining Army Force Structure, 1989 to 1997
YEAR ACTIVE DIVISIONS ACTIVE END-STRENGTH
1989 18 770,000
1997 10 495,000
Source: Taw, Jennifer M., David Presselin, Maren Leed,
Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW
Readiness, Santa Monica, California: RAND, MR-921-A, 1998,
5.
On the surface, it is plausible that the drawdown alone
could jeopardize the Army's ability to provide adequate
forces for even one MTW. The numbers from Table 1.1 seem to
support this idea. 23 After all, the Army committed roughly
ten of its 1991 inventory of eighteen divisions to the Gulf
War. It seems likely that another regional conflict of the
same scale would require a similar commitment of Army
forces. It follows that, apart from any other problems, the
Army is arguably not ready for one future Gulf War style
MTW, much less two. The Army simply does not have enough
forces to do the job. This point reinforces the argument
23 Because some of the 1991 era divisions were round out
units, the number of active divisions decreased by forty-




that as a result of the drawdown, the structural readiness
of the Army's combat forces is inadequate.
Army planners, however, believe a future MTW will
require only four to five divisions. 24 Based on this
assumption, the current ten-division force would provide
adequate forces even in the worst case scenario of two
simultaneous MTWs . While the number of divisions needed for
an MTW is debatable, what is not debatable is that due to
the drawdown, today's Army has significantly fewer forces
available to fight an MTW than it did during the Gulf War.
b. Peace Operations
It is also clear that even as the Army reduced its
force, it increased its participation in peace operations. 25
Because peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions
typically employ a large contingent of Army combat forces
(as does, of course an MTW) any degradation of a combat
unit's readiness as a result of PO participation will
directly affect that unit's readiness for its MTW role. 26
Successive missions in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia demanded a
24 Sortor, 2.
25 Richard Parker, "Readiness May Decline, Pentagon to Warn
Senators," Philadelphia Inquirer, 28 September 1998, 8.
26 As such, this thesis does not address the support to
diplomacy subset of peace operations because it does not
typically require combat forces.
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steady commitment of Army combat forces, (and in the case of
Bosnia, continue to demand) despite the simultaneous decline
in the available force. 27 Table 1.2 depicts the number of
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(* UNMIH- United Nations Mission In Haiti)
While proof that these missions necessarily degraded
the readiness of the combat units that participated in them
is not definitive, a growing body of anecdotal evidence from
27 Other significant POs of the post-Cold War era include
the ongoing mission in the Sinai as well as operations in
Rwanda and Macedonia. This study focuses on the POs listed
in Table 1.2 because of the large number of forces required
and their longer duration.
28 This number refers to the average number of battalions
deployed at one time throughout the period of the operation
For instance, the ongoing Bosnia mission requires the
constant presence of three battalions, which rotate every
four months.
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the field suggests they may have. 29 If peace operations do
degrade readiness, it follows that as the Army downsized and
PO commitments increased, readiness should have started to
decline. This has now occurred. It appears, therefore, that
the Army' s post-Cold War operational readiness decline is
directly correlated to its participation in POs.
The onset of the readiness crisis coincided with the
accelerated post Gulf War drawdown and PO missions in
Somalia and Haiti. As both the drawdown and PO participation
increased, reports of a readiness decline continued to
deepen. For instance, in 1995, long before recent official
recognition of the readiness problem, the current Chairman
of the House Armed Services Committee Senator Floyd Spence
in a letter to the Deputy Defense Secretary, observed,
U.S. military units are caught in the early stages
of a downward readiness spiral that shows no
prospect of easing in the foreseeable
future ... wholesale categories of combat units are
in a reduced state of readiness... 30
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The overall objective of this thesis is to present
alternative perspectives on: 1) the factors that underlie
the Army's readiness crisis and 2) the solutions required
29 Taw, Persselin, Leed, 33.
30 Clarke, 1.
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for real readiness improvements. These perspectives will go
beyond much of the current analysis that suggests the
readiness decline is simply the result of a declining
defense budget. By implication, it also challenges the
assumption that the decline is easily remedied with budget
increases that focus largely on quality of life
improvements. This thesis argues that to address the
fundamental source of the readiness problem, the absolute
size of the Army's combat forces must either increase or
their commitment to POs must decrease. Four distinct phases
will be used to present this argument.
C . METHODOLOGY
1 . Phase 1
Phase 1 of this thesis identifies and describes the
characteristics of the drawdown and POs that impact Army
combat readiness. The goal of this phase is to outline the
key factors of the drawdown and POs that are critical to the
development of a model that measures declining readiness.
The key factors of the drawdown include the post-Cold
War reduction of infantry and armor battalions from 160 to
ninety. One of the key factors of POs is the actual erosion
of combat skills suffered by deployed and supporting PO
units. Additional PO factors address the duration of the
15
peace operation, the unit rotation cycle, and the time in
between unit rotations.
2 . Phase 2
Phase 2 involves the development of a two-stage model
that measures the Army's combat readiness decline based on
the characteristics described in Phase 1. The goal of this
phase is to clearly describe the linkage between POs, the
drawdown, and readiness.
The model's first stage presents the idea of a
readiness threshold. The threshold refers to the maximum
number of units of an available force that can continually
deploy to support a protracted PO before the readiness of
the force rapidly deteriorates. The threshold represents the
"breaking point" for readiness. When the number of forces
deployed exceeds the threshold the impacts outlined in Phase
1 combine to eventually degrade combat readiness throughout
the entire force. The second stage of the model depicts how,
even if the number of units deployed are below the
threshold, readiness still declines but at a more gradual
rate
.
3 . Phase 3
Phase 3 applies the threshold model to analyze not only
the current impact of the drawdown and POs on the Army' s
16
combat readiness, but also to predict the consequences of
future PO commitments on readiness.
4 . Phase 4
The final phase contains the key findings and
implications of this study.
D . ORGANIZATION
The thesis has six chapters. Chapter II (Phase 1)
explains the PO and drawdown characteristics that affect
readiness. Chapter III (Phase 2) explains the development of
the readiness threshold model. Chapter IV (Phase 3) applies
the model in assessing the current and future readiness of
the Army. Chapter V (Phase 4) contains the findings and
implications from these applications of the model. Chapter
VI presents conclusions drawn from this thesis.
17
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II. PHASE 1: FACTORS AFFECTING READINESS
This chapter identifies specific ways in which the
drawdown and POs degrade the Army's combat readiness.
Additionally, the chapter outlines key assumptions based on
these characteristics. Identification of the structural and
operational readiness declines caused by the drawdown and
POs respectively, is the first step in establishing the
linkage between these two variables. Chapter III expands
this linkage into a model that measures Army combat
readiness based on the characteristics and assumptions in
this chapter.
A. DRAWDOWN FACTORS
1 . Reduction of Available Force
Perhaps the most obvious impact of the drawdown on the
Army's readiness is simply the reduction of its personnel
strength. As previously discussed, the drawdown cut over
one third of the Army's manpower. In terms of infantry and
armor combat units, the Army shrank from a 1991 high of 160
battalions, to the current number of ninety. These
remaining battalions constitute the ten-division force
recommended in the Bottom Up Review. 31
31 Sortor, 8.
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2 . Contingency and Later Deploying Divisions
Interestingly, the Army split the remaining ninety
battalions (or ten divisions) into two categories,
Contingency and Later Deploying. 32 Table 2.1 depicts this
split
.
Table 2.1. Organization of Army Divisions
CONTINGENCY LATER DEPLOYING
82 nd Airborne Div. 10 th Mountain Div. (L)
101 st Air Assault Div. 25 th Infantry Div. (L)
1
st Cavalry Div. 1 st Armored Div.
3
rd Infantry Div. (Mech.) 1 st Infantry Div.
2
nd Infantry Div. 4 th Infantry Div. (Mech.)
In the event of an MTW the Army will first deploy its
Contingency divisions. 33 Because they deploy first, these




The remaining five divisions, roughly half of the
Army's active combat units, are designated as Later
32 See Statement of Gebicke, Mark E., U.S. General
Accounting Office, MILITARY READINESS: Observations on
Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions, 20
March 1998, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126, 6.
33 The 2 nd ID is not a true Contingency Division. It is
already forward deployed in the Republic of Korea.
34 Gebicke, 2-3.
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Deploying forces. 35 These units are intended to either
reinforce contingency units or deploy in support of a second
MTW. Later Deploying units have no minimum personnel level.
In the aggregate, they maintain approximately ninety-three
percent of their authorized personnel. 36
A recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) report,
however, explains how aggregate numbers may mask crippling
personnel shortages in Later Deploying divisions:
...aggregate numbers do not adequately reflect the
condition that exists within individual
battalions, companies, and platoons of these
divisions. This is because excess personnel exist
in some grades, ranks, and skills, while shortages
exist in others. For example, while the 1 st
Armored Division was staffed at 94 percent in the
aggregate, its combat support and service support
specialties were filled at below 85 percent, and
captains and majors were filled at 73 percent. 37
This report and others like it indicate that readiness
problems, induced by severe personnel shortages, are rampant
in the Later Deploying divisions. 38 Based on personnel
35 The 4 th ID has been "off-line" for two years in its role
as the Army's experimental Force XXI Unit. Therefore, in
this thesis, it is not considered an active unit capable of
providing forces for an MTW.
36 Gibicke, 3.
37 Ibid., 3.
38 The GAO report on Later Deploying divisions made the
following claims: one third of infantry squads and all of
the anti-tank units were unmanned in the 10 th Infantry
Division's First Brigade, , almost half of the infantry squads
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shortages alone, it is quite possible that the readiness of
these units is considerably less than that of the
Contingency divisions. For the purpose of this study I
assume that in the aggregate, the Later Deploying divisions
maintain no more than a ninety percent readiness rating.
Establishment of a ninety percent readiness rating for
the Later Deploying divisions is an attempt to capture the
spirit of the GAO report that claimed personnel shortages
and training deficiencies were prevalent in these units. In
reality, the readiness rating of the Later Deploying
divisions may be slightly higher than ninety percent.
Given, however, the recent rash of anecdotal reports that
suggest otherwise, it is plausible to assume the rating is
actually much lower. Ninety percent, therefore, represents
a reasonable "middle ground" for the combat readiness
throughout the Later Deploying divisions.
3 . Later Deploying Divisions as the De-facto PO Force
Personnel shortages, though, are not the sole readiness
threat to Later Deploying divisions. Assignment to Peace
Operations may pose a more serious danger. Surprisingly,
during the post-Cold War era, these divisions executed the
majority of the Army's peace operations. Examples include
in the 2 nd Brigade, 1 st Infantry Division had no personnel
assigned, only 16 of 116 M1A1 tank crews of the 1 st Armored
Division's 3 rd Brigade had full four man crews qualified to
meet their wartime tasks.
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the 10 th Mountain Division's participation in Haiti and
Somalia and the 1 st Armored and 1 st Infantry Division's
commitments in Bosnia. Ostensibly, the Contingency divisions
are "fenced" from POs in order to ensure their capability to
deploy in support of an MTW
.
If the Later Deploying divisions are primarily
responsible for executing POs, the effects of POs (good or
bad) will be more widely felt in these divisions. The Later
Deploying divisions, therefore, offer an opportunity to
assess the impact of POs on a "sub-category" of the Army. As
such, in the next chapter on model development, this thesis
will use the Later Deploying divisions' thirty three combat
battalions as the base-line force with which to analyze the
effects of POs on combat readiness.
B. READINESS EFFECTS OF POs
Three factors of POs have a direct, measurable effect
on the readiness of the Army's combat forces: 1) the impact
on deployed units, 2) the impact on supporting units, 3) and
the impact of the rotation cycle.
1 . Impact on Deployed Units
A recent RAND study suggests that many core PO tasks
such as patrolling, security operations, and planning are
similar to tasks required for combat operations. 39 The
39 Taw, Presselin, Leed, 37-43.
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report concedes, however, that while the basic tasks in each
environment may be the same, their conditions and standards
are likely very different. For example, during a PO,
patrols are usually designed as a show of force. Therefore,
patrols are often passive and may occur in daylight. In a
combat environment the opposite conditions and standards
exist for the same task. Patrols in this environment are
aggressive, occur at night, and are designed with lethal
intent. A 1 st Armored Division soldier on duty in Bosnia
captures the distinction between the conditions of combat
and of POs by saying,
...our training was to maneuver and take the enemy
out. Here we've had to learn a different concept.
We had to learn not to shoot because you don't
really know who your enemy is. You have to sit
back, watch and try to keep the peace. 40
The authors of the RAND report claim there are ways to
mitigate the negative impact of the difference in conditions
and standards between combat and POs. They suggest options
such as creating live fire ranges or conducting expert
infantryman badge training will offset the deterioration of
combat skills associated with POs. 41
40 Ibid. , 37.
41 Ibid., 44. The authors also suggest that POs can improve
a unit's combat readiness.
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Many Army commanders disagree. They contend that the
negative impacts of POs are real and hard to overcome. One
battalion commander, recalling the post-PO mindset of his
soldiers, summed up the impact of POs by saying,
...some times, there was some reluctance to shoot
when shooting was appropriate ... Soldiers do what
they're trained to do, and it takes a long time to
change that. There is not some switch that you
can hit and say, "now you're a peacekeeper," or
"now you're a warfighter." It's not that simple.
It would be nice if it was, but it's not. 42
This study assumes that the readiness of a deploying
combat unit degrades to some degree during deployment to a
PO. The specific decline will depend on the nature of the
PO. For instance, on occasion in Somalia, the 10 th Infantry
Division performed tasks under conditions very similar to
combat. In this case, the degree of PO-induced operational
readiness decline for these units might not be great. The
10 th Infantry Division in Haiti, however, operated in a more
•benign environment. This mission, more than the Somalia
operation, was likely responsible for a decline in the
participants combat readiness.
42 See interview comments from LTC Ham, Commander of l-6 th
Infantry Battalion. U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons
Learned, Able Sentry Interview, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
Center for Army Lessons Learned, 18 August 1995.
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For the purpose of this thesis, It is assumed that a
combat unit that deploys to a PO for an extended period
suffers a thirty percent reduction in its combat readiness.
The use of thirty percent as the average readiness
decline attempts to acknowledge anecdotal evidence from the
field that suggests that POs negatively affect readiness.
At the same time, this percentage highlights the assertion
that not all POs will have the same effect. The decline in
readiness could be much worse, say a fifty percent decline,
or it might only be a ten to fifteen percent drop. Thirty
percent represents a general range of these possibilities.
2 . Impact on Support Units
The impact of a PO on the units that support deployed
forces is also significant. In general, a roughly three to
one ratio exists between the number of units deployed and
the number required to support that deployment. 43 In this
case, "supporting" refers to those combat units that are:
stripped of personnel, prevented from executing collective
training, and forced to increase their workload in order to
support the deployed force.
Most units that deploy to a PO do so at or above their
authorized personnel strength. Deploying units from Later
Deploying divisions are no exception. To deploy at 100
43 Sortor, 51.
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percent strength, however, they must augment with personnel
from other units. This process of transferring or
"stripping" usually entails taking key leaders or critical
military occupational specialties (MOSs) from sister units
to bring the deploying force to 100 percent strength. 44
Another impact on the stay-behinds is their inability
to execute collective training. To illustrate, if one
company of a battalion deploys to a PO, the remainder of the
battalion is unable to effectively execute battalion level
operations for the period of the company's deployment.
A third effect addresses the fact that the stay-behinds
experience a workload increase as a result of a PO
deployment. Again, when a company deploys, the rest of the
battalion must execute a wide range of actions that combine
to reduce available training time. These indirect support
actions can range from supervision of the deployed unit's
family support group, to execution of the deployed unit's
habitual garrison taskings.
Conversely, more resources such as ranges and
ammunition are available for the stay-behinds.
Unfortunately, because of the initial reduction in personnel
to support the deployed units, the stay-behinds may not be
able to fully exploit these advantages.
44 Taw, Pressilin, Leed, 15.
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The operational readiness reduction borne by the forces
that support the deployed during a PO are often overlooked.
For the purpose of this study, readiness of a combat unit
that supports a deployed force is assumed to decline by an
average of twenty percent over the duration of the
operation
.
The establishment of this twenty percent decline
attempts to address the concept that the impact on a unit's
readiness goes beyond simply the forces that deploy to a PO.
Again, this number, like the thirty percent decline of the
deployed referenced previously, represents a range. The
actual decline could be less or more depending on a variety
of other factors.
3 . Impact of the Rotation Cycle
The final impact of POs on a combat unit's readiness
concerns the dynamics of the rotation cycle.
The effect of the rotation cycle is most apparent
during a protracted PO. The longer the duration of the
mission, the greater the likelihood that units will execute
multiple rotations. The significance of the cycle becomes
apparent when the time between deployments for units shrinks
to less than twelve months. Most combat units, depending on
the specifics of the PO, require an average of at least six
months of retraining after deployment to regain their pre-
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deployment readiness levels. 45 Some studies, however,
suggest that not even one year between deployments may be
enough time to maintain readiness. For example, in another
RAND study, Jim Quinlivin suggests that,
If units have only a little more than a year for a
cycle of retraining to original role, maintaining
skills within their original role, and then
training to special deployment tasks, it seems
unlikely they will have time to progress to highly
integrated combined arms training. 46
This study captures the magnitude of the rotation
effect on the available force. It explains that as the
proportion of a given force deployed to an operation
increases, the time in between deployments for follow-on
units decreases. Figure 2.1 expresses this idea.
45 Sortor, 49.
46 Quinlivin, James, T., Force Requirements in Stability
Operations, Santa Monica, California: RAND,RP-479, 68.
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Figure 2.1. Time between deployments determined by the
fraction of the force deployed. 47
This simple dynamic has powerful implications for units
executing protracted POs . Figure 2.1 shows that with a four-
month rotation cycle, the time to next deployment rapidly
decreases with the fraction of the force deployed. For
example, when twenty percent of the available force deploys,
the time until the unit's next deployment is sixteen months.
When thirty percent of the force deploys, the time until
next deployment shrinks to eight months. 48
It is also important to note that the percentage of




both supporting and deployed units. This study assumes that
a unit recovers at least ten percent of its readiness with
each four-month period of recovery time. For instance, at
the end of a four-month PO rotation, the deployed unit's
readiness has declined by thirty percent. At the end of the
first four months of recovery its readiness improves to
eighty percent. At the end of eight months of recovery its
readiness reaches ninety percent. After twelve months, the
unit is fully recovered and ready to re-deploy for another
PO rotation.
In essence, the effect of the rotation cycle simply
adds to the readiness decline of the deployed and supporting
units. The repercussion of the rotation effect on a large
commitment of forces to a protracted PO could easily, over
time, cripple the readiness of the Later Deploying divisions
and possibly the entire Army.
C . SUMMARY
Table 2.2 summarizes the characteristics of the
drawdown and PO factors addressed in this chapter. It also
includes the assumptions regarding how these factors









Drawdown -Overall Force decline
-Emergence of Contingency
vs. Later Deploying Div.
-160 vs. 90 Combat BNs
-Contingency Div. @98-100% Ready
-Later Deploy. Div. @90% Ready
Later Deploying Division,
as primary PO force
-33 of 90 BNs absorb PO effects
Peace Op. -3:1 Ratio between Deployed
and Support Force





30% Readiness Decline during
4 month deployment
20% Readiness Decline during
4 month cycle
Increase in deployed force =
decrease in time between
deployments
-Each 4 months of recovery =
a 10% readiness recovery for
the deployed and support force
The next chapter, Phase 2 of this thesis, develops a
model that depicts the linkage between the characteristics
and assumptions regarding the Army' s combat readiness that
were presented in this chapter.
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III. PHASE 2: THE READINESS THRESHOLD MODEL
The model to be developed in this chapter measures the
effect on the Army' s combat readiness when the operational
readiness declines induced by POs combine with the
structural readiness declines created by the drawdown. The
model presents the concept that as the number of units
deployed to a PO fluctuate, so does the readiness of the
force contributing units to the PO. Specifically, when the
number of units deployed falls below a certain limit or
threshold, the readiness decrease felt by the contributing
force is additive and gradual. Conversely, when the number
of forces deployed exceed this threshold, the readiness
decline of the contributing force is geometric, resulting in
a rapid, self-reinforcing decline
A. THE CONCEPT OF A READINESS THRESHOLD
In the early 1990s, when the Army had 160 combat
battalions (or eighteen divisions) and committed only a few
to POs, the effect on the remaining battalions was hard to
discern. For instance, the Multi-National Force and
Observer mission in the Sinai, ongoing since 1982, reguires
a continual six month rotation of one infantry battalion
task force. Prior to the drawdown, concerns as to how this
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mission and others like it, (ones that required even more
forces) might erode the combat readiness of the Army were
almost non-existent. Today, however, because of the
reduction in the number of available combat units, the
impact of a PO of any size is more visible.
The drawdown revealed that there is a limit, or
threshold, on the number of battalions the Army can commit
to POs at one time before readiness of the total force
deteriorates rapidly. Figure 3.1 depicts how this threshold,
during the post-Cold War era, decreased as the number of
combat battalions in the Army inventory declined.
-•— BNs Available
a— Threshold













92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Years
Figure 3.1. Change in Readiness Thresholds
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In 1992, for instance, the eighteen division Army (160
combat battalions) had a PO threshold of approximately forty
battalions. By 1997, the ten division Army's threshold
dropped to 22.5 battalions. Even more significantly, by
1998, the readiness threshold for the Later Deploying
divisions (the de-facto PO force) plummeted to only 8.25
combat battalions.
B. THE READINESS THRESHOLD AND THE ROTATION EFFECT
The character of the graph in Figure 3.1 indicates that
the threshold is a constant twenty-five percent of the
available force. The derivation of the twenty-five percent
limit is based on some of the key characteristics and
assumptions of the PO and drawdown factors presented in
Phase 1. Specifically, the model reflects the impact of the
rotation cycle--the amount of time a unit has before it must
re-deploy to a PO depends on the fraction of the force
deployed. The twenty five percent limit also applies to the
additional Phase 1 constraints:
1) a protracted PO sustained by a four-month rotation
cycle of combat battalions
2) a minimum requirement of twelve months between
rotations
Applying these constraints to the thirty-three
battalions of the Later Deploying divisions illustrates the
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significance of the readiness threshold concept. It follows
that, the Later Deploying divisions have a threshold of 8.25
battalions (twenty-five percent of thirty-three) . If more
than 8.25 battalions, for instance ten, (thirty percent)
deploy to a protracted PO, seven of the ten, during the 4 th
rotation, will have to redeploy "early." In this sense
"early" means the seven battalions will not have had a full
twelve months to recover from their first rotation before
they return for the second time. Table 3.1 outlines this
process
.
Table 3.1. Derivation of the Readiness Threshold of the
Later Deploying Divisions
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Readiness begins to decline when units must redeploy
to a PO with less than twelve months between deployments.
Mathematically, it is possible for the Later Deploying
divisions to deploy twenty-five percent of its force
indefinitely. Table 3.1 indicates that each rotation of 8.25
battalions has exactly twelve months of recovery time before
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the next deployment. Re-deployment before the twelve month
mark, however, initiates a chain reaction of readiness
decline that forces each successive deploying force to
rotate at a decreasing level of readiness . The implications
of exceeding the readiness threshold are severe. If the Army
deploys too many of its combat battalions in support of a
protracted PO, it will eventually destroy its combat
readiness
.
C. THE THRESHOLD AND DEPLOYED AND SUPPORTING EFFECTS
While Table 3.1 explains the impact of deploying an
increasingly larger number of battalions to a PO, it does
not account for the thirty and twenty percent respective
declines in the readiness of the deployed and support forces
that participated in the PO. When the declines of the
deployed and support forces are included in the model, it
becomes apparent that even when the number of units deployed
falls below the threshold, readiness of the entire force
still declines. Figure 3.2 reflects the incorporation of
deployed and supporting effects on the deployment of various
levels of the Later Deploying divisions while maintaining
the constraints addressed in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.2 depicts how a three year long PO would
affect Later Deploying divisions at increasing levels of
deployment. For example, when six battalions deploy, the
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readiness of the entire force declines from ninety percent




Readiness Threshold (8.25 BNs)
Figure 3.2. Readiness Thresholds of Later Deploying
Divisions at Various Deployment Levels During a Three Year
PO.
After the next four-month rotation, the readiness of the
force drops to seventy-nine percent. After the third
rotation, the readiness drops two more percentage points to
seventy-seven percent, and levels off there after. The
cumulative effect of a six-battalion PO commitment on the
49 Again, the Phase 2 assumption contends that the Later
Deploying divisions maintain only a ninety percent readiness
rating at any one time.
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Later Deploying divisions, therefore, is a loss of thirteen
percent of the total readiness of the force. The thirteen-
percent loss represents the additive, gradual decline of
readiness when the number of units deployed is below the
threshold.
Additionally, Figure 3.2 also shows that the commitment
of twelve battalions (four units above the threshold) to a
PO causes the readiness of the Later Deploying divisions to
decline with each successive deployment without ever
stabilizing. For instance, after one rotation of twelve
battalions, the readiness of the Later Deploying divisions
is seventy-six percent. After four rotations it drops to
fifty-one percent. After eight rotations it falls to twenty
percent. This pattern of decline represents the rapid self-
reinforcing, geometric deterioration of readiness when the
number of units deployed exceed the readiness threshold.
D. DETERMINATION OF THE THRESHOLD FOR THE LATER DEPLOYING
DIVISIONS
Development of a tracking chart like the one in Table
3.2 assists in identifying the specific readiness declines
portrayed in Figure 3.2.
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Table 3.2. 36 Month Readiness Decline When 9 Battalions
of the Later Deploying Divisions are Committed to a PO.
Months Deployed? Support!? Not Used Recovering Later
%Readiness %Readiness % Readiness % Readiness Deploying
Readiness
4 9060 3070 21090 .80
8 9060 3070 9090 9070 .74
3080
12 9060 3050 3090 .70
9080
9070









28 9040 3050 6070 .55
6060
9050
32 9040 3040 6070 .52
6060
9050
36 6040 3040 9060 .48
3030 12050
Note: Recall from Phase 1 the assumptions that:
1) Readiness of Deployed Forces declines by 30% each
rotation
2) Readiness of Supporting Forces declines by 20% each
rotation
3) Readiness of Recovering Forces increases by 10% each
rotation
Table 3.2 tracks the readiness of all thirty-three





year PO that requires a nine-battalion commitment. 50 The
tracking process begins with the assumption of a "fair"
sequence of deployment and support roles for all thirty-
three battalions. 51 For instance, during the first four
month rotation, battalions 1-9 deploy, and battalions 10-12
support. 52 For the next rotation, battalions' 13-22 deploy
and battalions 23-25 support. 53 This "fair" sequence
applies until units begin to re-deploy without the necessary,
twelve months between rotations.
Table 3.2 shows that with a nine-battalion commitment
the first "early" redeployment occurs at the beginning of
the third rotation or at twelve months. At this point,
three of the nine units that, at the end of the second
rotation, had recovered to only seventy percent, must serve
"early" as the support force for the third rotation. After
50 Appendixes A-D contain tables for rotations of three,
six, twelve, and fifteen battalions.
51 When battalions are actually selected for commitment to a
PO, a "fair" sequence of rotation is unlikely. Other factors
ranging from real world commitments to rotations at command
directed exercises would likely prevent a "fair' sequencing
of the Later Deploying division' s battalions to a protracted
PO.
52 This maintains the 3:1 ratio mentioned in Chapter 2.
53 During this second rotation, battalions 1-8 and 10-12
would begin their first four-month recovery period. Applying
the ten percent recovery assumption from Phase 1, at the end
of the four months, the readiness of 1-9 would improve to
seventy percent. The readiness of 10-12 would improve to
eighty percent.
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the rotation its readiness reduced by another twenty
percent, the supporting forces' readiness drops to fifty
percent. From this point on, and throughout the rest of the
protracted PO, units must either deploy or support at an
increasingly lower level of readiness. For instance, at the
end of twenty-four months, the deployed force is a mix of
six units at only fifty percent readiness and three units at
just forty percent readiness.
It is possible to calculate the readiness decline of
the entire force at the end of each rotation iteration. The
far right column of Table 3.1 contains the overall readiness
percentage of the Later Deploying divisions at the different
rotation intervals. The numbers represent the various
readiness percentages of the iteration multiplied by the
number of battalions at each percentage. Adding these
products and then dividing by thirty-three yields quotients
corresponding to the readiness declines in Figure 3.1.
E. SUMMARY
The Readiness Threshold model can be used as a tool to
assess the impact of the drawdown and POs on the combat
readiness of a given force. In the next phase, Phase 3, the
model will be used to assess not only the Army' s current
combat readiness but also to predict the readiness impact of
future PO commitments.
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IV. PHASE 3: APPLYING THE READINESS THRESHOLD MODEL
The purpose of Phase 3 is to illustrate the utility of
the Readiness Threshold Model as a viable tool to measure
the structural and operational readiness declines caused by
the drawdown and POs
.
A. THE THRESHOLD AND CURRENT READINESS
Today the U.S. Army has one major PO commitment,
Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia. 54 This mission requires a
steady commitment of three infantry or armor battalions. To
facilitate this commitment, the Army decided to institute a
four-month rotation policy. Significantly, since its
inception, one division at a time has had responsibility for
the mission. The 1 st Armored Division started the operation
in December 1995. It executed three, four-month rotations
using a brigade each time. In November of 1996 the 1 st
Infantry Division, which followed a similar rotation policy,
replaced the 1 st Armored Division. The 1 st Armored again took
over the mission in October of 1997. In fact, these two
units, the 1 st Armored and 1 st Infantry Divisions are the
54 Other commitments, such as the Multi-national Force and
Observer Mission in the Sinai, currently exist, but for the
purpose of this thesis are not considered major POs.
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only major Army force participants in the Bosnia operation
to date. 55
It is important to note that both of these units are
members of Later Deploying divisions. Their assignment to
the Bosnia operation supports the GAO claim, presented
earlier, that the Later Deploying divisions are the Army's
de facto PO forces. 56
The negative impact on the combat readiness of these,
two divisions from the Bosnia rotations was, and continues
to be, significant. In a recent visit to Bosnia, Senator
Carl Levin of the Senate Armed Forces Committee concluded,
"the Pentagon should begin thinking about how to spread the
mission's burden among more that just European-based U.S.
forces". 57 The Senator's comments were a result of his
concern that "readiness and morale will be degraded by
multiple deployments to Bosnia." 58 Senator Levin's judgement
55 Some other units, like the 10 th Infantry Division and the
2 nd Armored Cavalry Division provided additional units, but
the majority of troops were from the 1 st Armored and 1 st
Infantry Divisions.
56 Other factors, however, like the proximity of these units
to Bosnia could also explain their assignment to the
mission
.
57 Maze, Rick, "Spread the Bosnia Burden Throughout," Army
Times, Jan 1998, 14.
58 Ibid.
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was correct for reasons, in part, that he might not have
fully appreciated.
Using the Readiness Threshold Model, it is possible to
determine just how the Bosnia mission has negatively
influenced the readiness of the Later Deploying divisions.
The character of the chart in Figure 4.1 supports one of the
main premises of the Threshold Model; when the number of
forces deployed to a PO is below the threshold, readiness
declines gradually and eventually stabilizes.
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Figure 4.1. Current Readiness of Later Deploying
Divisions With a Three Battalion PO Commitment.
The chart in Figure 4.1 indicates that after thirty-six
months of three battalions rotating at four-month intervals,
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the readiness of the Later Deploying divisions slips to
approximately eighty four percent.
Use of the model to determine the readiness threshold
of just the two units that have actually conducted the
Bosnia mission during the past three years, reveals an even
more alarming readiness shortfall. The readiness threshold
for these two units (the 1 st Infantry and 1 st Armored
Division's) is 4.5 battalions. 59 The model predicts that as
the number of deployed forces reaches this limit, their
readiness should decline more rapidly before stabilizing at
a lowered readiness level. The current three battalion
sustained deployment rate for Operation Joint-Forge, is
dangerously close to this threshold. Therefore, the
readiness declines experienced by the combat battalions
committed to the Bosnia operations as observed by Senator
Levin, are likely the predictable result of limiting the
impact of a protracted PO to only a few units.
In addition, it appears the Army is re-thinking the
wisdom of assigning to just a few units the burden of
executing a protracted PO. Recently, for the first time in
the post-Cold War era, the Army decided to commit a
Contingency Division to a major PO. The 1 st Cavalry Division
59 The two divisions have a total of eighteen battalions.
Using the calculations from Phase 2, the readiness threshold
for these two units is approximately twenty-five percent or
4 . 5 battalions
.
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replaced the 1 st Armored Division in Bosnia in November of
1998. This action may offer tacit recognition that the
Later Deploying divisions, especially the 1 st Infantry and
1
st Armored, need relief from the corrosive readiness burden
of a protracted PO. The repercussions of assigning these
"first to fight" units to Peace Operations will be mixed at
best. On the surface, assignment of PO responsibility to a
contingency division will ease the readiness decline in the
Later Deploying divisions. Unfortunately, it will also usher
in a new readiness decline in the Contingency divisions.
This decline directly threatens the Army' s ability to
provide operationally ready forces for an MTW.
B. FUTURE READINESS: ANOTHER PEACE OPERATION
If the use of the 1 st Cavalry Division signals the
Army' s recognition that the burden of POs must be spread
beyond the Later Deploying divisions, the burden of yet
another PO might debilitate the Army' s readiness to a point
beyond affordable repair. What if for instance, the U.S.
were to commit troops to a Bosnia-style PO in Kosovo? To
begin with, the total number of battalions committed to POs
would increase from the current number of three, to six.
This increase would pose a significant problem for the Army.
The main obstacle in this scenario initially might be to
determine which unit should take on the Kosovo PO? If
47
another Contingency division were to receive the assignment
the implications for MTW readiness become dire.
Alternately, if a Later Deploying division were committed,
this unit would forgo the relief from PO duty that the
assignment of the 1 st Cavalry to Bosnia was intended to
provide in the first place.
C. EXTENDING THE MODEL BEYOND THE LATER DEPLOYING
DIVISIONS
Extending the model beyond the scope of the Later
Deploying divisions to encompass the entire Army provides a
method to determine how a "two PO scenario" would affect
total Army readiness.
Extension of the model in this manner requires
calculating the readiness threshold for all of the Army'
s
seventy-eight battalions. The threshold in this case is
19.5 battalions (or twenty-five percent of seventy-eight). 60
In the future scenario of an additional PO, the number
deployed (six) is well below the threshold. Even though this
number is less than even one third of the threshold, there
is still however, a significant loss of readiness for the
total Army. This loss is similar in scope to the readiness
drop observed when three of the Later Deploying divisions
60 Seventy-eight includes all of the Army's active infantry
and armor battalions minus the nine battalions of the 4 th
Infantry Division currently committed to Force XXI.
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Figure 4.2. Comparison of Readiness at Three and Six
Battalion Deployments Between the Later Deploying Divisions
and the Entire Army .
The figure above shows that when three battalions from
the Later Deploying divisions participate in a protracted
PO, their readiness eventually declines by approximately 6.5
percent. Similarly, when six battalions deploy (regardless
if they are from the Later Deploying divisions or not) , the
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Army as a whole loses more than five percent of its overall
readiness
.
D. SUMMARY OF MODEL APPLICATIONS
This analysis takes on even greater significance in
conjunction with one of the key assumptions behind both the
BUR and the QDR: the idea that in the event of an MTW, the
forces executing PO would withdraw and prepare to deploy to
the MTW. This assumption fails to fully consider the
operational readiness decline that PO participation creates.
The readiness model reveals that the forces executing a PO
will not be completely ready for immediate MTW deployment.
In fact, PO participation can easily cripple the readiness
of committed forces and have a debilitating "ripple effect"
on forces that are not deployed. Further, as the size of
the force deployed increases, so does the magnitude of the
negative effects on the rest of the force.
Aside from the obvious geo-political instability
resulting from a PO withdrawal, (or quick hand-off to the
reserves or foreign forces), the salient point of this
analysis is that the units withdrawn from a PO will not be
ready to deploy to an MTW without a significant amount of
train-up time.
Using a worst-case example, if the U.S. was committed
to two prolonged POs when an MTW broke out, of the seventy-
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two available battalions, only thirty-six (four divisions)
would be at (supposedly) 100 percent readiness. The
remaining thirty-six battalions would be at various levels
of readiness. Some battalions would be ninety percent ready-
--not yet deployed to a PO. Some battalions would be only
sixty percent ready just returning from a PO rotation.
Expansion of the Readiness Threshold Model to include
the Contingency divisions highlights the utility of the
model as a tool to assess the readiness of the entire Army
to execute an MTW. The following chapter addresses the model
implications for MTW readiness as well as other concerns
implied by the model.
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PHASE 4 : IMPLICATIONS AND FINDINGS
...coordinating simultaneous wars with the shrunken
military of the post-cold war era would be a charade.
Dr. Richard Betts 61
...an argument to increase the size of the Army would
never sell... The point is we can't get any smaller than
we are today.
Senior Army Official 62
The application of the model in the preceding chapter
reveals several implications with potentially serious
consequences for the National Military strategy. Not the
least of these is that the Army may not have the ability to
provide an adequate quantity of troops possessing the
quality necessary to fight and win two MTWs without
significant risk. Taken a step further, application of the
model also implies that the U.S. Military strategy may need
to re-address the viability of the two MTW concept. Other
implications suggest both restructuring the current force
size and reevaluating commitments to current and future POs
.
This chapter will first outline the findings from this
study and then address some of the policy implications that
result from these findings
61 Betts, 51.
62 Sean Naylor, "Readiness for Two Wars in Question," Army
Times, 14 September 1998, 10.
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A. FINDINGS
1 . First Finding
The central finding of this thesis is that the Army' s
readiness crisis is in great part a function of compounding,
self-reinforcing declines in both its structural and
operational readiness. Recall that operational readiness
addresses the efficiency or quality of a given force. The
important indicators of operational readiness include fill
of assigned manpower in existing units and status of
individual and unit training. Conversely, structural
readiness focuses on the mass or quantity of a given force.
Its important indicators are the numbers of troops under
arms and available units.
The drawdown shrank the size of the Army. Subsequent
personnel shortages occurred because the number of existing
units exceeded the available force that could man them. It
is reasonable, then, to suggest that the drawdown is
'responsible for the structural or quantity aspect of the
readiness crisis. The operational or quality aspect of the
decline is a function in great part due to participation in
POs . The negative impact of PO participation compounds the
shortcomings of the Army's structural readiness problem.
The current PO in Bosnia, for instance, forces units
that already lack an adequate number of soldiers, to play a
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"shell game" with personnel to meet the demands of
continuous PO rotations. This "game" eventually causes a
reduction in the operational readiness of the participating
combat forces.
The results of model application from Chapter IV,
indicate that due to the Bosnia PO alone, the total Army's
readiness is currently down almost six percent. As
previously noted, this drop in readiness is attributable to
the compounding effects of structural and operational
readiness .
If the current readiness crisis is viewed from the
perspectives of both the quantity and quality of the
available force, it becomes clear that more cannot be done
with less without some costs. In this case, the readiness of
its combat units is the cost incurred by the Army in over-
committing its reduced force to POs
.
2 . Second Finding
The second finding of this study is that the current
solution to the readiness crisis advocated by the Chief of
Staff of the Army ignores the operational and structural
impacts implied by the model. Rather than address the
tension between size and commitment, the Army, as well as
the other services, has instead mistakenly focused on
quality of life issues as the most pressing aspect of the
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readiness crisis. As such, the official solution to the
readiness crisis is to overhaul the retirement system and
close the pay gap. 63 Under this plan it appears that the
Army is intent on bringing the actual capability of its
existing units up to their potential, "by making its
available mass as efficient as possible." 64
With this approach, the Army is clearly focusing on
the operational aspect of readiness improvement in the
quality of the force, to reverse the readiness decline.
Unfortunately, this is too narrow an approach as it ignores
the operational readiness decline created by POs as well as
the structural readiness decline ushered in by the drawdown.
As a result, the quality of life "readiness fix" advocated
by the Army will likely fall far short of reversing the
long-term readiness decline of its combat forces.
B. IMPLICATIONS
1 . Risk to MTW Success
To reiterate, the most significant implication derived
from the findings of this study is the contention that the
Army may have neither the quality nor the quantity of
63 Testimony of Gen. Douglas Riemer. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Armed Services, Status of U.S. Armed Forces
Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 105 th
Congress, 2 nd Session, 29 September 1998.
64 Betts, 41.
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soldiers available to execute the National Military strategy
without a significant increased risk. In this context, risk
is not defined as risk of defeat, but rather the risk that
the Army will be forced to incur a higher rate of casualties
to achieve victory:
...citing the length of time it would take forces to
reach a second conflict, Gen. Henry Shelton, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, recently ordered the risk
of such a mission to be rated "high" for the first




The prognosis for a second MTW, however, is even
bleaker when the impacts of the threshold model are
considered. Increasingly, it appears that the structural
readiness of the Army' s current combat forces is simply
inadequate for a "two MTW" military strategy. PO induced
operational readiness declines serve only to reinforce this
inadequacy. Despite the Chairman's recent claim that the
Armed Forces are "ready to execute the National Military
strategy, including two overlapping major theater wars,"
many others disagree. 66 For example, a senior Army official
recently stated that "it was not clear that the Pentagon
65 Parker, "Readiness May Decline," 8.
66 Statement of Gen. Henry Shelton. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Armed Services, Status of U.S. Armed Forces:
Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 105 th
Congress, 2 nd Session, 29 September 1998.
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could carry out its stated mission to win two major regional
wars at once...." 67 Furthermore, Dr. Betts suggests that:
...both the wars in Vietnam and the Gulf were undertaken
by the hefty cold war military establishment. To
pretend that the United States could do better in
coordinating simultaneous wars with the shrunken
military of the post-cold war era would be a charade. 68
If it is, however, possible in principle, as the
Chairman suggests, to execute two MTWs with the current
force, the readiness impact indicated by the model still
must be considered. While it is possible to say the current
force is capable of two MTWs it is quite another to explain
how capable. The use of the Readiness Threshold Model in
calculating the current readiness shortfall—an almost six
percent drop in effectiveness--illustrates this point.
While seventy-eight battalions are currently "on-hand", not
all of these battalions, (due to current PO commitments),
are "ready" for MTW participation. The notional effective
readiness of these battalions is 100 percent. The actual
effective readiness of these forces from the perspective of
the model is only eighty-four percent.
2 . A New Strategy?
Based on the argument outlined in this study, it may be
time to consider altering the current "two MTW" National
67 Myers, "Military Leaders Make Case." 22
68 Betts, 51.
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Military strategy. This may be especially true since the
remedies currently advocated for "curing" the readiness
crisis will not significantly alter the structural and
operational factors behind the decline. If, as Dr. Betts
claims, the "two MTW" strategy is a "charade", its
perpetuation serves only to complicate and confuse the
readiness issue. Ostensibly, if the Army had to only
contend with one MTW, its current readiness status, although
problematic, would be more acceptable. Faced with only one
MTW, the Army could eleminate a few divisions and more
equitably spread personnel to ensure all units were 100
percent filled. Additionally, while the effects of POs would
still be felt, there would be a reasonable assurance that
the non-participating forces could handle one MTW even if
their overall readiness was "down" due to the ongoing POs.
Beyond changing to a "one MTW" strategy, other
suggestions include the idea of a win-hold-win concept.
This strategy consists of "a plan to fight a defensive
holding action for a prolonged period in a secondary
theater," while fully prosecuting the primary war in the
first theater. 69
69 Ibid. , 207.
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3 . Other Implications
Two other implications emerge from this study:
increasing the force or decreasing participation in POs.
Like changing the National Military strategy, these ideas
are probably not politically tenable. Nonetheless they
deserve consideration.
a. Reevaluation of the Current Force Structure
An increase in the size of the Army's combat
forces will enhance the structural, long-term readiness of
the Army. A significant increase in the number of combat
units in the Army inventory would mitigate the operational
readiness declines resulting from POs. A force increase
would effectively spread the negative impacts of POs across
a greater sized force. Additionally, a larger force would
allow a more realistic expectation of executing a "two MTW"
military strategy.
Again, in the post-Cold War era, and in the
current environment of balanced budgets, an increase in the
size of the Army's combat forces may not be a realistic
goal. In the words of one senior Army official, "an argument
to increase the size of the Army would never sell... The
point is we can't get any smaller than we are today." 70
70 Naylor, "Readiness for Two Wars in Question," 10
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b. Reevaluation of PO Commitments
Similarly, a reevaluation of the commitment of the
Army' s combat forces to POs would mitigate the short-term
operational readiness decline these missions tend to create.
A reduction in the number of units committed to POs and
avoidance of future commitments would also improve the
Army's structural readiness for the "two MTW" strategy.
The Kosovo scenario presented in Chapter IV
addresses the impact of an additional Bosnia-style PO on the
operational readiness of the Army. Before committing the
Army combat forces to future POs, policy makers must be
aware of the real potential of a readiness "free fall" as
the number of units deployed to POs becomes closer to the
readiness threshold of the total available forces.
The feasibility of actually reducing the current
level or lowering the future level of PO commitment is slim.
The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement
implies a continued role for the Army's combat forces in POs




I must say this is almost an Orwellian experience for
me to have you here today as opposed to your appearance last
February when you came before this committee and gave a
dramatically different view of the readiness and
requirements that the military needs to maintain our
capabilities
.
Sen. John McCain 71
...policy debate about the costs and benefits of proposals
to enhance readiness tends to be confused. When concern
about the {readiness} issue peaks ... confusion also peaks.
Dr. Richard Betts 72
Like most politically charged topics, advocates or
opponents of certain positions often oversimplify both
problems and solutions. Military Readiness, because it is a
multifaceted, highly complex issue is no exception.
Unfortunately, oversimplification tends to lead to a general
sense of confusion concerning where the readiness decline
comes from and how best to reverse it. While confusion may
well explain the current lack of clarity and depth regarding
solutions to the readiness crisis, it certainly does not
excuse it
.
71 Comment directed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff during
Congressional hearings. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, Status of U.S. Armed Forces: Hearing before the




For instance, to suggest that the readiness of the
Army and by association, its ability to prevail in a "two
MTW" scenario with the proper quality and quantity of
soldiers will dramatically increase by improving quality of
life issues is misleading. In the words of one exasperated
U.S. Senator during recent congressional hearings on
readiness, "the best quality of life, is to bring troops
back alive." 73
The confusion over readiness begins with its very
definition. As mentioned in the beginning of this study, in
order to have an informed discussion of readiness the issue
must be viewed from the perspective of the following
questions: 1) What should be ready? 2) What should it be
ready for? 3) How soon should it be ready? Without the
framework these questions provide, discussion of the
readiness issue is problematic at best. The additional
perspectives of operational and structural readiness are
also necessary to further define the nature of the problem
and its solution.
The current quality of life "fix" proposed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff avoids the more expensive and politically
73 Comment directed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff during
Congressional hearings. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, Status of U.S. Armed Forces: Hearing before the
Committee on Armed Services, 105 th Congress, 2 nd Session, 29
September 1998.
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unpopular solutions to the problem such as: abandonment of
the "two MTW" strategy, increasing the size of the total
force, or decreasing PO commitments of the force that is
currently available. While quality of life concerns do
exist and do influence Army readiness, they are but a small
part of the larger readiness problem.
The alternative perspective on readiness that this
study advocates, that is, viewing the readiness decline from
both operational and structural perspectives, could be
extended beyond just the Army's readiness crisis. The basic
premise of the model could be used to analyze the readiness
declines plaguing the rest of the Armed Forces. The Navy for
instance "recently estimated that it was short 18,000
sailors fleetwide" 74 and that it "sends ships to sea with
increasingly skeletal crews." 75 The Air Force,
...also is worried about personnel shortages.
Patrolling no-fly zones in northern and southern
Iraq and Bosnia, and putting on shows of force in
the air over Kosovo, the Air Force is the busiest
it has been since Desert Storm. 76
The fundamentals that underlie the readiness crises of
the Army's sister services are similar to its own.
74 Pexton, "Dwindling Ranks," 12.
75 Parker, "Readiness May Decline, "8
76 Pexton, "Dwindling Ranks," 12.
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Increasingly, the U.S. Military, not just the Army, is being




APPENDIX A. 36 MONTH READINESS DECLINE WHEN 3 BATTALIONS OF
THE LATER DEPLOYING DIVISION ARE COMMITTED TO A PO
Month # Deployed # Supporting # Not Yet # Recovering Later
% Ready % Ready % Ready % Ready Deploying
Division
Readiness
4 3060 1070 29090 86.6
8 3060 1070 25090 3070
1080
84.5






























APPENDIX B. 36 MONTH READINESS DECLINE WHEN 6 BATTALIONS OF
THE LATER DEPLOYING DIVISION ARE COMMITTED TO A PO
Month # Deployed # Supporting # Not Yet # Recovering Later
% Ready % Ready % Ready % Ready Deploying
Division
Readiness
4 6060 2070 25090 83.3
8 6060 2070 17090 6070
2080
79.0






























APPENDIX C. 36 MONTH READINESS DECLINE WHEN 12 BATTALIONS
OF THE LATER DEPLOYING DIVISION ARE COMMITTED TO A PO
Month # Deployed # Supporting # Not Yet # Recovering Later
% Ready % Ready % Ready % Ready Deploying
Division
Readiness
4 12060 4070 17090 76.6





















































APPENDIX D. 36 MONTH READINESS DECLINE WHEN 15 BATTALIONS OF
THE LATER DEPLOYING DIVISION ARE COMMITTED TO A PO
Month # Deployed # Supporting # Not Yet # Recovering Later
% Ready % Ready % Ready % Ready Deploying
Division
Readiness






12 3050 3040 0090 10070 47.8
10040 2020 3050
2010
















28 1500 500 0090 13010 1.0
32 1500 500 0090 1700 0.0
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